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Abstract
A machine learning model may exhibit discrimination when used to make
decisions involving people. One potential cause for such outcomes is that the
model uses a statistical proxy for a protected demographic attribute. In this paper
we formulate a definition of proxy use for the setting of linear regression and
present algorithms for detecting proxies. Our definition follows recent work on
proxies in classification models, and characterizes a model’s constituent behavior
that: 1) correlates closely with a protected random variable, and 2) is causally
influential in the overall behavior of the model. We show that proxies in linear
regression models can be efficiently identified by solving a second-order cone
program, and further extend this result to account for situations where the use of
a certain input variable is justified as a “business necessity”. Finally, we present
empirical results on two law enforcement datasets that exhibit varying degrees
of racial disparity in prediction outcomes, demonstrating that proxies shed useful
light on the causes of discriminatory behavior in models.
1 Introduction
The use of machine learning in domains like insurance [23], criminal justice [18], and child wel-
fare [28] raises concerns about fairness, as decisions based on model predictions may discriminate
on the basis of demographic attributes like race and gender. These concerns are driven by high-
profile examples of models that appear to have discriminatory effect, ranging from gender bias in
job advertisements [10] to racial bias in same-day delivery services [21] and predictive policing [3].
Meanwhile, laws and regulations in various jurisdictions prohibit certain practices that have
discriminatory effect, regardless of whether the discrimination is intentional. For example, the
U.S. has recognized the doctrine of disparate impact since 1971, when the Supreme Court held in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. [25] that the Duke Power Company had discriminated against its black
employees by requiring a high-school diploma for promotion when the diploma had little to do
with competence in the new job. These regulations pose a challenge for machine learning models,
which may give discriminatory predictions as an unintentional side effect of misconfiguration or
biased training data. Many competing definitions of disparate impact [3, 14] have been proposed in
efforts to address this challenge, but it has been shown that some of these definitions are impossible
to satisfy simultaneously [8]. Therefore, it is important to find a workable standard for detecting
discriminatory behavior in models.
Much prior work [19, 29] has focused on the four-fifths rule [17] or variants thereof, which are
relaxed versions of the demographic parity requirement that different demographic groups should
receive identical outcomes on average. However, demographic parity does not necessarily make
a model fair. For example, consider an attempt to “repair” a racially discriminatory predictive
policing model by arbitrarily lowering the risk scores of some members of the disadvantaged race
until demographic parity is reached. The resulting model is still unfair to individual members of
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the disadvantaged race that did not have their scores adjusted. In fact, this is why the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that demographic parity is not a complete defense to claims of disparate impact [26].
In addition, simply enforcing demographic parity without regard for possible justifications for
disparate impact may be prohibited on the grounds of intentional discrimination [27].
Recent work on proxy use [11] addresses these issues by considering the causal factors behind
discriminatory behavior. A proxy for a protected attribute is defined as a portion of the model that
is both causally influential [13] on the model’s output and statistically associated with the protected
variable. This means that, in the repair example above, the original discriminatory model is a proxy
for a protected demographic attribute, indicating the presence of discriminatory behavior in the
“repaired” model. However, prior treatment of proxy use has been limited to classification models,
so regression models remain out of reach of these techniques.
In this paper, we define a notion of proxy use (Section 2) for linear regression models, and show how
it can be used to inform considerations of fairness and discrimination. While the previous notion of
proxy use is prohibitively expensive to apply at scale to real-world models [11], our definition admits
a convex optimization procedure that leads to an efficient detection algorithm (Section 3). Because
disparate impact is not always forbidden, we extend our definition to account for an exempt input
variable whose use for a particular problem is justified. We show that slight modifications to our
detection algorithm allow us to effectively “ignore” proxies based on the exempt variable (Section 4).
Finally, in Section 5 we evaluate our algorithm with two real-world predictive policing applications.
We find that the algorithm, despite taking little time to run, accurately identifies parts of the model
that are the most problematic in terms of disparate impact. Moreover, in one of the datasets, the
strongest nonexempt proxy is significantly weaker than the strongest general proxy, suggesting
that proxy use can sometimes be attributed to a single input variable. In other words, the proxies
identified by our approach effectively explain the cause of discriminatory model predictions,
informing the consideration of whether the disparate impact is justified.
1.1 Related Work
We refer the reader to [6] for a detailed discussion of discrimination in machine learning from a
legal perspective. One legal development of note is the adoption of the four-fifths rule by the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in 1978 [17]. The four-fifths “rule” is a guideline
that compares the rates of favorable outcomes among different demographic groups, requiring that
the ratio of these rates be no less than four-fifths. This guideline motivated the work of Feldman et
al. [19], who guarantee that no classifier will violate the four-fifths rule by removing the association
between the input variables and the protected attribute. Zafar et al. [29] use convex optimization to
find linear models that are both accurate and fair, but their fairness definition, unlike ours, is derived
from the four-fifths rule. We show in Section 2.5 that proxy use is a stronger notion of fairness than
demographic parity, of which the four-fifths rule is a relaxation.
Other notions of fairness have been proposed as well. Dwork et al. [16] argue that demographic
parity is insufficient as a fairness constraint, and instead define individual fairness, which requires
that similar individuals have similar outcomes. While individual fairness is important, it is not
well-suited for characterizing disparate impact, which inherently involves comparing different de-
mographic groups to each other. Hardt et al. [20] propose a notion of group fairness called equalized
odds. Notably, equalized odds does not require demographic parity, i.e., groups can have unequal
outcomes as long as the response variable is also unequally distributed. For example, in the context
of predictive policing, it would be acceptable to categorize members of a certain racial group as a
higher risk on average, provided that they are in fact more likely to reoffend. This is consistent with
the current legal standard, wherein disparate impact can be justified if there is an acceptable reason.
However, some have observed that the response variable could be tainted by past discrimination [6,
Section I.B.1], in which case equalized odds may end up perpetuating the discrimination.
Our treatment of exempt input variables is similar to that of resolving variables by Kilbertus et
al. [22] in their work on causal analysis of proxy use and discrimination. A key difference is that
they assume a causal model and only consider causal relationships between the protected attribute
and the output of the model, whereas we view any association with the protected attribute as suspect.
Our notion of proxy use extends that of Datta et al. [11, 12], who take into consideration both
association and influence. An alternative measure of proxy strength has been proposed by Adler et
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al. [1], who define a single real-valued metric called indirect influence. As we show in the rest of this
paper, the two-metric-based approach of Datta et al. leads to an efficient proxy detection algorithm.
2 Proxy Use
In this section we present a definition of proxy use that is suited to linear regression models. We
first review the original definition of Datta et al. [11] for classification models and then show how
to modify this definition to get one that is applicable to the setting of linear regression.
2.1 Setting
We work in the standard machine learning setting, where a model is given several inputs that
correspond to a data point. Throughout this paper, we will use X = (X1, . . . , Xn) to denote
these inputs, where X1, . . . , Xn are random variables. We consider a linear regression model
Yˆ = β1X1 + · · · + βnXn, where βi represents the coefficient for the input variable Xi. We will
abuse notation by using Yˆ to represent either the model or its output.
In the case where each data point represents a person, care must be taken to avoid disparate impact
on the basis of a protected demographic attribute, such as race or gender. We will denote such
protected attribute by the random variable Z. In practice, Z is usually binary (i.e., Z ∈ {0, 1}), but
our results are general and apply to arbitrary numerical random variables.
2.2 Proxy Use in Prior Work
Datta et al. [11] define proxy use of a random variable Z as the presence of an intermediate
computation in a program that is both statistically associated with Z and causally influential on
the final output of the program. Instantiating this definition to a particular setting therefore entails
specifying an appropriate notion of “intermediate computation”, a statistical association measure,
and a causal influence measure.
Datta et al. identify intermediate computations in terms of syntactic decompositions into subpro-
grams P , Yˆ ′ such that Yˆ (X ) ≡ Yˆ ′(X , P (X )). Then the association between P and Z is given
by an appropriate measure such as mutual information, and the influence of P on Yˆ is defined as
shown in Equation 1, where X and X ′ are drawn independently from the population distribution.
InflYˆ (P ) = PrX ,X ′
[Yˆ (X ) 6= Yˆ ′(X , P (X ′))], (1)
Intuitively, influence is characterized by the likelihood that an independent change in the value of
P will cause a change in Yˆ . This makes sense for classification models because a change in the
model’s output corresponds to a change in the predicted class of a point, as reflected by the use of
0-1 loss in that setting. On the other hand, regression models have real-valued outputs, so the square
loss is more appropriate for these models. Therefore, we are motivated to transform Equation 1,
which is simply the expected 0-1 loss between Yˆ (X ) and Yˆ ′(X , P (X ′)), into Equation 2, which is
the expected square loss between these two quantities.
E
X ,X ′
[(Yˆ (X )− Yˆ ′(X , P (X ′)))2] (2)
Before we can reason about the suitability of this measure, we must first define an appropriate
notion of intermediate computation for linear models.
2.3 Linear components
The notion of subprogram used for discrete models [11] is not well-suited to linear regression. To
see why, consider the model Yˆ = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3. Suppose that this is computed using
the grouping (β1X1 + β2X2) + β3X3 and that the definition of subprogram honors this ordering.
Then, β1X1 + β2X2 would be a subprogram, but β1X1 + β3X3 would not be even though Yˆ could
have been computed equivalently as (β1X1 + β3X3) + β2X2. We might attempt to address this
by allowing any subset of the terms used in the model to define a subprogram, thus capturing the
commutativity and associativity of addition. However, this definition still excludes expressions such
as β1X1 + 0.5β3X3, which may be a stronger proxy than either β1X1 or β1X1 + β3X3. To include
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such expressions, we present Definition 1 as the notion of subprogram that we use to define proxy
use in the setting of linear regression.
Definition 1 (Component). Let Yˆ = β1X1 + · · · + βnXn be a linear regression model. A
random variable P is a component of Yˆ if and only if there exist α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] such that
P = α1β1X1 + · · ·+ αnβnXn.
2.4 Linear association and influence
Having defined a component as the equivalent of a subprogram in a linear regression model, we
now formalize the association and influence conditions given by Datta et al. [11].
Association. A linear model only uses linear relationships between variables, so our association
measure only captures linear relationships. In particular, we use the Pearson correlation coefficient,
and we square it so that a higher association measure always represents a stronger proxy.
Definition 2 (Association). The association of two nonconstant random variables P and Z is
defined as Asc(P,Z) = Cov(P,Z)
2
Var(P )Var(Z) .
Note that Asc(P,Z) ∈ [0, 1], with 0 representing no linear correlation and 1 representing a fully
linear relationship.
Influence. To formalize influence, we continue from where we left off with Equation 2. Def-
inition 1 gives us Yˆ (X ) = ∑ni=1 βiXi and Yˆ ′(X , P (X ′)) = ∑ni=1(1 − αi)βiXi + αiβiX ′i .
Substituting these into Equation 2 gives
E
X ,X ′
[(Yˆ (X )− Yˆ ′(X , P (X ′)))2] = E
X ,X ′
[(
∑n
i=1 αiβiXi − αiβiX ′i)2] = Var(P (X )− P (X ′)),
which is proportional to Var(P (X )) since X and X ′ are i.i.d. Definition 3 captures this reasoning,
normalizing the variance so that InflYˆ (P ) = 1 when P = Yˆ (i.e., α1 = · · · = αn = 1).
In Appendix A, we also show that variance is the unique influence measure (up to a constant
factor) satisfying some natural axioms that we call nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity, and
zero-covariance additivity.
Definition 3 (Influence). Let P be a component of a linear regression model Yˆ . The influence of P
is defined as InflYˆ (P ) =
Var(P )
Var(Yˆ )
.
When it is obvious from the context, the subscript Yˆ may be omitted. Note that influence can
exceed 1 because the inputs to a model can cancel each other out, leaving the final model less
variable than some of its components.
Finally, the definition of proxy use for linear models is given in Definition 4.
Definition 4 ((, δ)-Proxy Use). Let , δ ∈ (0, 1]. A model Yˆ = β1X1 + · · · + βnXn has
(, δ)-proxy use of Z if there exists a component P such that Asc(P,Z) ≥  and InflYˆ (P ) ≥ δ.
2.5 Connection to Demographic Parity
We now discuss the relationship between proxy use and demographic parity, and argue that proxy
use is a stronger definition that provides more useful information than demographic parity. For
binary classification models with two demographic groups, demographic parity is defined by the
equation Pr[Yˆ = 1|Z = 0] = Pr[Yˆ = 1|Z = 1], i.e., two demographic groups must have the same
rates of favorable outcomes. We adapt this notion to regression models by replacing the constraint
on the positive classification outcome with the expectation of the response, as shown in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Demographic Parity, Regression). Let Yˆ be a regression model, and let Z be a binary
random variable. Yˆ satisfies demographic parity if E[Yˆ |Z = 0] = E[Yˆ |Z = 1].
Equation 3 shows that our association measure is related to demographic parity in regression models.
Asc(Yˆ , Z) =
Cov(Yˆ , Z)2
Var(Yˆ )Var(Z)
= (E[Yˆ |Z = 0]− E[Yˆ |Z = 1])2 · Var(Z)
Var(Yˆ )
, (3)
4
zθ
(a) z is a vector representation of the protected
attribute Z, and components of the model can
also be represented as vectors. If a component
is inside the red double cone, it exceeds the
association threshold , where the angle θ is set
such that  = cos2 θ. The cone on the right side
corresponds to positive correlation with Z, and
the left cone negative correlation. Components
in the blue shaded area exceed some influence
threshold δ. If any component exceeds both the
association and the influence thresholds, it is a
proxy and may be disallowed.
β1x1
β2x2
0.7β1x1
+ β2x2
(b) x1 and x2 are vector representations of X1
and X2, which are inputs to the model Yˆ =
β1X1+β2X2. The gray shaded area indicates the
space of all possible components of the model.
β1X1 is a component, but it is not a proxy because
it does not have strong enough association with
Z. Although β2X2 is strongly associated with Z,
it is not influential enough to be a proxy. On the
other hand, 0.7β1X1+β2X2 is a component that
exceeds both the association and the influence
thresholds, so it is a proxy and may be disallowed.
Figure 1: Illustration of proxy use with the vector interpretation of random variables. In the above
examples, all vectors lie in R2 for ease of depiction. In general, the vectors z,x1, . . . ,xn can span
Rn+1.
In particular, if Yˆ does not satisfy demographic parity, then Asc(Yˆ , Z) > 0, so Yˆ is an (, 1)-proxy
for some  > 0. This means that our proxy use framework is broad enough to detect any violation of
demographic parity. On the other hand, the “repair” example in Section 1 shows that demographic
parity does not preclude the presence of proxies. Therefore, proxy use is a strictly stronger notion
of fairness than demographic parity.
Moreover, instances of proxy use can inform the discussion about a model that exhibits demographic
disparity. When a proxy is identified, it may explain the cause of the disparity and can help decide
whether the behavior is justified based on the set of variables used by the proxy. We elaborate on
this idea in Section 4, designating a certain input variable as always permissible to use.
3 Finding Proxy Use
In this section, we present our proxy detection algorithms, which take advantage of properties
specific to linear regression to quickly identify components of interest. We prove that we can use
an exact optimization problem (Problem 1) to either identify a proxy if one exists, or definitively
conclude that there is no proxy. However, because this problem is not convex and in some cases may
be intractable, we also present an approximate version of the problem (Problem 2) that sacrifices
some precision. The approximate algorithm can still be used to conclude that a model does not
have any proxies, but it may return false positives. In Section 5, we evaluate how these algorithms
perform on real-world data.
Because the only operations that we perform on random variables are addition and scalar multipli-
cation, we can safely treat the random variables as vectors in a vector space. In addition, covariance
is an inner product in this vector space. As a result, it is helpful to think of random variables
Z,X1, . . . , Xn as vectors z,x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Rn+1, with covariance as dot product. Under this
interpretation, influence is characterized by InflYˆ (P ) ∝ Var(P ) = Cov(P, P ) = p · p = ‖p‖2,
where ‖·‖ denotes the `2-norm, and association is shown in Equation 4, where θ is the angle
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Problem 1 Exact optimization
min −‖A′α‖2
s.t. 0  α  1 and ‖A′α‖ ≤ s · z
TA′α√
‖z‖
Problem 2 Approximate optimization
min −cTα
s.t. 0  α  1 and ‖A′α‖ ≤ s · z
TA′α√
‖z‖
Figure 2: Optimization problems used to find proxies in linear regression models. A′ is the
(n+1) × n matrix [β1x1 . . . βnxn], and we optimize over α, which is an n-dimensional
vector of the alpha-coefficients used in Definition 1.  is the association threshold, and c is the
n-dimensional vector that satisfies ci = ‖βixi‖.
between the two vectors p and z.
Asc(P,Z) =
Cov(P,Z)2
Var(P )Var(Z)
=
(
p · z
‖p‖‖z‖
)2
= cos2 θ, (4)
This abstraction is illustrated in more detail in Figure 1.
To find coordinates for the vectors, we consider the covariance matrix [Cov(Xi, Xj)]i,j∈{0,...,n},
where Z = X0 for notational convenience. If we can write this covariance matrix as ATA for
some (n+1) × (n+1) matrix A, then each entry in the covariance matrix is the dot product of two
(not necessarily distinct) columns of A. In other words, the mapping from the random variables
Z,X1, . . . , Xn to the columns of A preserves the inner product relationship. Now it remains to
decompose the covariance matrix into the form ATA. Since the covariance matrix is guaranteed to
be positive semidefinite, two of the possible decompositions are the Cholesky decomposition and
the matrix square root.
Our proxy detection algorithms use as subroutines the optimization problems that are formally
stated in Figure 2. We first motivate the exact optimization problem (Problem 1) and show how the
solutions to these problems can be used to determine whether the model contains a proxy. Then, we
present the approximate optimization problem (Problem 2), which sacrifices exactness for efficient
solvability.
Let A′ be the (n+1) × n matrix [β1x1 . . . βnxn]. The constraint 0  α  1 restricts the
solutions to be inside the space of all components, represented by the gray shaded area in Figure 1b.
Moreover, when s ∈ {−1, 1}, the constraint ‖A′α‖ ≤ s · (zTA′α)/(√‖z‖) describes one of
the red cones in Figure 1a, which together represent the association constraint. Subject to these
constraints, we maximize the influence, which is proportional to ‖A′α‖2. Theorem 1 shows that
this technique is sufficient to determine whether a model contains a proxy.
Theorem 1. Let P denote the component defined by the alpha-coefficients α. The linear regression
model Yˆ = β1X1 + · · ·+ βnXn contains a proxy if and only if there exists a solution to Problem 1
with s ∈ {−1, 1} such that InflYˆ (P ) ≥ δ.
Proof. It is clear that P is a component if and only if the constraint 0  α  1 is satisfied. We now
show that the second constraint in Problem 1 is the correct association constraint.
Let p = α1β1x1 + · · · + αnβnxn = A′α be the vector representation of P . From Equation 4, we
know that Asc(P,Z) ≥  if and only if (p · z)2 ≥ (‖p‖‖z‖)2. This inequality holds if and only if
p · z√
‖z‖ ≥ ‖p‖ or −
p · z√
‖z‖ ≥ ‖p‖,
where the former inequality represents positive correlation between P and Z, and the latter negative
correlation. Making the substitution p = A′α, we see that P is a component with strong enough
association if and only if it meets the constraints in Problem 1 with either s = 1 or s = −1.
Therefore, if P is a solution to the optimization problem and InflYˆ (P ) ≥ δ, it is a component that
exceeds both the association and influence thresholds, which means that it is a proxy. This proves
the reverse direction of the theorem statement.
To prove the forward direction, we consider the influence. We have InflYˆ (P ) ∝ Var(P ) = ‖p‖2 =‖A′α‖2, so minimizing−‖A′α‖2, as done in Problem 1, has the effect of maximizing the influence.
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Suppose that P is a proxy, i.e., P is a component such that Asc(P,Z) ≥  and InflYˆ (P ) ≥ δ.
Without loss of generality, Cov(P,Z) > 0. Then, P satisfies the constraints of Problem 1 with
s = 1, so the solution to the optimization problem must be at least as influential as P . The forward
direction of the theorem statement follows from the assumption that P has influence at least δ.
In essence, Theorem 1 guarantees the correctness of the following proxy detection algorithm: Run
Problem 1 with s = 1 and s = −1, and compute the association and influence of the resulting
solutions. The model contains a proxy if and only if any of the solutions passes both the association
and the influence thresholds.
It is worth mentioning that Problem 1 tests for strong positive correlation with Z when s = 1 and for
strong negative correlation when s = −1. This optimization problem resembles a second-order cone
program (SOCP) [7, Section 4.4.2], which can be solved efficiently. However, the objective function
is concave, so the standard techniques for solving SOCPs do not work on this problem. To get around
this issue, we can instead solve Problem 2, which has a linear objective function whose coefficients
ci = ‖βixi‖ were chosen so that the inequality ‖A′α‖ ≤ cTα always holds. This inequality allows
us to prove Theorem 2, which mirrors the claim of Theorem 1 but only in one direction.
Theorem 2. If the linear regression model Yˆ = β1X1 + · · · + βnXn contains a proxy, then there
exists a solution to Problem 2 with s ∈ {−1, 1} such that cTα ≥ (δVar(Yˆ ))0.5.
Proof. Because the proof is very similar to the proof of the forward direction of Theorem 1, we
only point out where the proofs differ. Let P be a proxy of Yˆ , and let α be the corresponding vector
of alpha-coefficients. We will show that cTα ≥ (δVar(Yˆ ))0.5.
By the definition of proxy, we have InflYˆ (P ) = Var(P )/Var(Yˆ ) ≥ δ. Since
Var(P ) = ‖p‖2 = ‖A′α‖2, we can rewrite this as ‖A′α‖ ≥ (δVar(Yˆ ))0.5. Finally, the desired
inequality follows from the observation that ‖A′α‖ = ‖∑ni=1 αiβixi‖ ≤∑ni=1 αi‖βixi‖ = cTα
by the triangle inequality.
Theorem 2 suggests a quick algorithm to verify that a model does not have any proxies. We solve
the SOCP described by Problem 2, once with s = 1 and once with s = −1. If neither solution
satisfies cTα ≥ (δVar(Yˆ ))0.5, by the contrapositive of Theorem 2, we can be sure that the model
does not contain any proxies.
However, the converse does not hold, i.e., we cannot be sure that the model has a proxy even if
a solution to Problem 2 satisfies cTα ≥ (δVar(Yˆ ))0.5. This is because cTα overapproximates
‖A′α‖ by using the triangle inequality. As a result, it is possible for the influence to be below the
threshold even if the value of cTα is above the threshold. While there is in general no upper bound
on the overapproximation factor of the triangle inequality, the experiments in Section 5 show that
this factor is not too large in practice. In addition, Problem 1 often works well enough in practice
despite not being a convex optimization problem.
4 Exempt Use of a Variable
So far, we have shown how to find a proxy in a linear regression model, but we have not discussed
which proxies should be allowed and which should not. As mentioned in Section 1, disparate impact
is legally permitted if there is sufficient justification. For example, in the context of predictive polic-
ing, it may be acceptable to consider the number of prior convictions even if one racial group tends
to have a higher number of convictions than another. We formalize this idea by assuming that the
use of one particular input variable, which we call the exempt variable, is explicitly permitted. This
assumption may be appropriate if, for example, the exempt variable is directly and causally related
to the response variable Y . Throughout this section, we will use X1 to denote the exempt variable.
First, we formally define which proxies are exempt, i.e., permitted because the proxy use is
attributable to X1. Clearly, if the model ignores every input except X1, all proxies in the model
should be exempt. Conversely, if the coefficient β1 of X1 is zero, no proxies should be exempt.
We capture this intuition by ignoring X1 and checking whether the resulting component is a proxy.
More formally, if P = α1β1X1 + · · ·+αnβnXn is a component, we investigate P \X1, which we
write as shorthand for the component α2β2X2 + · · ·+ αnβnXn. If P is a proxy but P \X1 is not,
then P is exempted because the proxy use can be attributed to the exempt variable X1.
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However, one possible issue with this attribution is that the other input variables can interact
with X1 to create a proxy stronger than X1. For example, suppose that Asc(X2, Z) = 0 and
P = X1 + X2 = Z. Then, even though P \ X1 = X2 is not a proxy, it makes P more strongly
associated with Z than X1 is, so it is not clear that P should be exempt on account of the fact that
we are permitted to use X1. Therefore, our definition of proxy exemption in Definition 6 adds the
requirement that P should not be too much more associated with Z than X1 is.
Definition 6 (Proxy Exemption). Let P be a proxy component of a linear regression model,
and let X1 be the exempt variable. P is an exempt proxy if P \ X1 is not a proxy and
Asc(P,Z) < Asc(X1, Z) + 
′, where ′ is the association tolerance parameter.
We can incorporate the exemption policy into our search algorithm with small changes to the
optimization problem. By Definition 6, a proxy P is nonexempt if either P \ X1 is a proxy or
Asc(P,Z) ≥ Asc(X1, Z) + ′. For each of these two conditions, we modify the optimization prob-
lems from Section 3 to find proxies that also satisfy the condition. If either of these modifications
return a positive result, then we have found a nonexempt proxy.
We start with the second condition, for which it is easy to see that it suffices to change the
association threshold in Problem 2 from  to max(,Asc(X1, Z) + ′). For the first condition, we
use the result from Theorem 3 and simply add the constraint that α1 = 0. If we add this constraint
to Problem 2, the resulting problem is still an SOCP and can therefore be solved efficiently.
Theorem 3. A linear regression model contains a proxy P such that P \X1 is also a proxy if and
only if the model contains a proxy such that α1 = 0.
Proof. First, we prove the forward direction. Let P be a proxy such that P \ X1 is also a proxy.
Then, P \X1 satisfies α1 = 0 by definition.
To prove the reverse direction, we let P be a proxy such that α1 = 0. Then, P \X1 = P , so P and
P \X1 are both proxies.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithms on real-world predictive policing
datasets. We ran our proxy detection algorithms on observational data from Chicago’s Strategic
Subject List (SSL) model [9] and the Communities and Crimes (C&C) dataset [15]. The creator of
the SSL model claims that the model avoids variables that could lead to discrimination [4], and if
this is the case then we would expect to see only weak proxies if any. On the other hand, the C&C
dataset contains many variables that are correlated with race, so we would expect to find strong
proxies in a model trained with this dataset.
To test these hypotheses, we implemented Problems 1 and 2 with the cvxopt package [2] in
Python. The experimental results confirm our hypotheses and show that our algorithm runs very
quickly (< 1 second). Moreover, our algorithms pinpoint components of the model that are the
most problematic in terms of disparate impact, and we find that the exemption policy discussed in
Section 4 removes the appropriate proxies from the SSL model.
For each dataset, we briefly describe the dataset and present the experimental results, demonstrating
how the identified proxies can provide evidence of discriminatory behavior in models. Then, we
explain the implications of these results on the false positive and false negative rates in practice,
and we discuss how a practitioner can decide which values of  and δ to use.
Strategic Subject List. The SSL [9] is a model that the Chicago Police Department uses to assess
an individual’s risk of being involved in a shooting incident, either as a victim or a perpetrator. The
SSL dataset consists of 398,684 rows, each of which corresponds to a person. Each row includes the
SSL model’s eight input variables (including age, number of previous arrests for violent offenses,
and whether the person is a member of a gang), the SSL score given by the model, and the person’s
race and gender.
We searched for proxies for race (binary black/white) and gender (binary male/female), filtering
out rows with other race or gender. After also filtering out rows with missing data, we were left
with 290,085 rows. Because we did not have direct access to the SSL model, we trained a linear
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Association threshold  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
Actual infl. (Prob. 1) 0.8816 0.2263 0.1090 0.0427* 0.0065* 0.0028 0.0000
Approx. infl. (Prob. 2) 1.6933 0.6683 0.3820 0.1432 0.0270 0.0085 0.0000
Actual infl. (Prob. 2) 0.8476 0.1874 0.0987 0.0420 0.0080 0.0027 0.0000
Table 1: Influence of the components obtained by solving the exact (Problem 1) and approximate
(Problem 2) optimization problems for the SSL model using Z = race and s = 1. No component
had strong enough association when s = −1 instead. Asterisks indicate that the exact optimization
problem terminated early due to a singular KKT matrix. The approximate optimization problem did
not have this issue, and the overapproximation that it makes of the components’ influence is shown
in the second row.
regression model to predict the SSL score of a person given the same set of variables that the SSL
model uses. Our model explains approximately 80% of the variance in the SSL scores, so we
believe that it is a reasonable approximation of the true model for the purposes of this evaluation.
The strengths of the proxies for race are given in Table 1. The estimated influence was computed
as (cTα)2/Var(Yˆ ), which is the result of solving for δ in the inequality given in Theorem 2.
We found that this estimate is generally about 3–4× larger than the actual influence. Although
the proxies for race were somewhat stronger than those for gender, neither type had significant
influence (δ > 0.05) beyond small  levels (~0.03–0.04). This is consistent with our hypothesis
about the lack of discriminatory behavior in this model.
We also tested the effect of exempting the indicator variable for gang membership in the input.
Gang membership is more associated with both demographic variables than any other in among the
inputs, and is a plausible cause of involvement in violent crimes [5], making it a prime candidate for
exemption. As contrasted with the components described in Table 1, every nonexempt component
under this policy has an association with race less than 0.033. This means that the strongest
nonexempt proxy is significantly weaker than the strongest general proxy, suggesting that much of
the proxy use present in the model can be attributed to the gang membership variable.
Communities and Crimes. C&C [24] is a dataset in the UCI machine learning repository [15]
that combines socioeconomic data from the 1990 US census with the 1995 FBI Uniform Crime
Reporting data. It consists of 1,994 rows, each of which corresponds to a community (e.g.,
municipality) in the U.S., and 122 potential input variables. After we removed the variables that
directly measure race and the ones with missing data, we were left with 90 input variables.
We simulated a hypothetical naive attempt at predictive policing by using this dataset to train a linear
regression model that predicts the per capita rate of violent crimes in a community. We defined
the protected attribute Z as the difference between the percentages of people in the community
who are black and white, respectively. We observed a strong association in the dataset between
the rate of violent crime and Z (Asc(Y,Z) = 0.48), and the model amplifies this bias even more
(Asc(Yˆ , Z) = 0.65).
As expected, we found very strong proxies for race in the model trained with the C&C dataset. For
example, one proxy consisting of 58 of the 90 input variables achieves an influence of 0.34 when
 = 0.85. Notably, the input variable most strongly associated with race has an association of only
0.73, showing that in practice multiple variables combine to result in a stronger proxy than any
of the individual variables. In addition, the model contains a proxy whose association is 0.40 and
influence is 14.5. In other words, the variance of the proxy is 14.5 times greater than that of the
model; this arises because other associated variables cancel most of this variance in the full model.
As a result, exempting any one variable does not result in a significant difference since associated
variables still yield proxies that are nearly as strong. Moreover, a cursory analysis suggested that
the variables used in these proxies are not justifiable correlates of race, so an exemption policy may
not suffice to “explain away” the discriminatory behavior of the model.
False Positives and False Negatives. Theorem 1 shows that our exact proxy detection algorithm
detects a proxy if and only if the model in fact contains a proxy. In other words, if Problem 1
returns optimal solutions, we can use the solutions to conclusively determine whether there exists
a proxy, and there will be no false positives or false negatives. However, our experiments show that
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sometimes Problem 1 terminates early due to a singular KKT matrix, and in this case one can turn
to the approximate proxy detection algorithm.
Although Problem 2 sometimes returns solutions that are not in fact proxies, we can easily ascertain
whether any given solution is a proxy by simply computing its association and influence. However,
even if the solution returned by Problem 2 turn out to not be proxies, the model could still contain
a different proxy. Using Table 1 as reference, we see that this happens in the SSL model if, for ex-
ample,  = 0.02 and δ is between 0.1874 and 0.2263. Therefore, one can consider the approximate
algorithm as giving a finding of either “potential proxy use” or “no proxy use”. Theorem 2 shows
that a finding of “no proxy use” does indeed guarantee that the model is free of proxies. In other
words, the approximate algorithm has no false negatives. However, the algorithm overapproximates
influence, so the algorithm can give a finding of “potential proxy use” when there are no proxies,
resulting in a false positive. This happens when δ is between the maximum feasible influence (first
row in Table 1) and the maximum feasible overapproximation of influence (second row in Table 1).
Reasonable Values of  and δ. Although the appropriate values of  and δ depend on the appli-
cation, we remind the reader that association is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient.
This means that an association of 0.05 corresponds to a Pearson correlation coefficient of ~0.22,
which represents not an insignificant amount of correlation. Likewise, influence is proportional to
variance, which increases quadratically with scalar coefficients. Therefore, we recommend against
setting  and δ to a value much higher than 0.05. To get an idea of which values of δ are suitable for
a particular application, the practitioner can compare the proposed value of δ against the influence
of the individual input variables βiXi.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have formalized the notion of proxy discrimination in linear regression models and
presented an efficient proxy detection algorithm. We account for the case where the use of one vari-
able is justified, and extending this result to multiple exempt variables is valuable future work that
would enable better handling of models like C&C that take many closely related input variables. De-
veloping learning rules that account for proxy use, leading to models without proxies above specified
thresholds, is also an intriguing direction with direct potential for impact on practical scenarios.
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A Axiomatic Justification of the Influence Measure
In this section, we argue that variance is the natural metric for quantifying the influence of a
component. We take an axiomatic approach, proving that variance is the unique function, up to a
multiplicative constant, that satisfies a few desirable properties of an influence measure.
While the influence measure was motivated by the need to characterize the behavior of some compo-
nent P of model Yˆ , it can quantify the behavior of general random variables as well. Therefore, in
this section we work in the general setting where P need not be a component of Yˆ . In particular, this
means that we omit the subscript Yˆ in the notation InflYˆ (P ). We note that, if we restrict P to be a
component of Yˆ , sometimes (e.g., when Yˆ takes in only one input) it is impossible to impose mean-
ingful restrictions on the influence measure with natural axioms such as the ones we present here:
Nonnegativity. Infl(P ) ≥ 0 for all P .
Nonconstant positivity. Infl(P ) = 0 if and only if P is a constant.
Additivity. Infl(P1 + P2) = Infl(P1) + Infl(P2) for all P1 and P2.
Nonconstant positivity comes from the observation that any nonconstant component has nonzero
influence on a linear regression model, and the other two axioms are properties that we consider
reasonable for an influence measure. Unfortunately, these axioms are inconsistent. To see this, let
P be a nonconstant random variable. Then, Infl(P ) + Infl(−P ) = 0 by nonconstant positivity, but
by additivity, Infl(P ) + Infl(−P ) = Infl(P − P ) = Infl(0) = 0. The issue is that two random
variables can cancel out, so we relax the additivity axiom so that it only applies when the two
variables are independent:
Independent additivity. If P1 and P2 are independent, Infl(P1 + P2) = Infl(P1) + Infl(P2).
Because linear models cannot capture any nonlinear associations, two variables with zero covariance
may as well be independent as far as the linear model is concerned. This fact motivates our final
version of the additivity axiom, shown below:
Zero-covariance additivity. If Cov(P1, P2) = 0, Infl(P1 + P2) = Infl(P1) + Infl(P2).
Now we prove that the combination of nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity, and zero-covariance
additivity require the use of variance as the influence measure. We first argue that Infl(P )+Infl(−P )
must be proportional to the variance of P , and then we proceed to show that Infl(P ) and Infl(−P )
must in fact be equal.
Lemma 4. Suppose Var(P1) = Var(P2). If Infl satisfies nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity, and
zero-covariance additivity, then Infl(P1) + Infl(−P1) = Infl(P2) + Infl(−P2).
Proof. Let P be an independent random variable such that Var(P ) = Var(P1) = Var(P2).
It is always possible to find such P ; for example, P could be drawn independently from the
distribution that P1 was drawn from. Because Cov(P + P1, P − P1) = Var(P ) − Var(P1) = 0,
by zero-covariance additivity we have
Infl(2P ) = Infl(P + P1) + Infl(P − P1) = Infl(P ) + Infl(P1) + Infl(P ) + Infl(−P1).
Similarly, Infl(2P ) = Infl(P ) + Infl(P2) + Infl(P ) + Infl(−P2), and our desired result follows
from combining the above two equations.
Theorem 5. Let Infl be an influence measure that satisfies nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity,
and zero-covariance additivity. Then, Infl(P ) + Infl(−P ) = cVar(P ), where c can be any fixed
positive constant.
Proof. By Lemma 4, Infl(P ) + Infl(−P ) = f(Var(P )) for some function f with domain [0,∞).
It remains to show that f(x) must have the form cx for some positive constant c.
Let P1 and P2 be independent random variables with variances v1 and v2, respectively. Then,
Var(P1 + P2) = v1 + v2, and by zero-covariance additivity, we have
f(v1 + v2) = Infl(P1 + P2) + Infl(−P1 − P2)
= Infl(P1) + Infl(−P1) + Infl(P2) + Infl(−P2) = f(v1) + f(v2)
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for all nonnegative v1 and v2. This is only possible if f is a linear function of x. Therefore, we can
write f(x) = cx for some c, which must be positive due to nonconstant positivity.
Having shown that Infl(P )+Infl(−P ) is a linear function of Var(P ), we now we want to show that
Infl(P ) = Infl(−P ). For brevity, we use γ(P ) = Infl(P )+Infl(−P )2 to denote what Infl(P ) would be
if it is indeed true that Infl(P ) = Infl(−P ). Now consider Infl(P ) as the sum of two expressions
γ(P ) and Infl(P ) − γ(P ). Lemma 6 shows that these two expressions have different growth rates
in P .
Lemma 6. Let γ(P ) = Infl(P )+Infl(−P )2 . If Infl satisfies nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity, and
zero-covariance additivity, then Infl(2nP ) = 2n(Infl(P )− γ(P )) + 4nγ(P ) for all integer n.
Proof. First, we prove the theorem for all nonnegative n by induction on n. The base case where
n = 0 is trivial.
Let P ′ be an independent random variable such that Var(P ) = Var(P ′). Then,
Cov(P + P ′, P − P ′) = Var(P )−Var(P ′) = 0, so by zero-covariance additivity,
Infl(2n+1P ) = Infl(2n(P + P ′)) + Infl(2n(P − P ′))
= Infl(2nP ) + Infl(2nP ′) + Infl(2nP ) + Infl(−2nP ′)
= 2 Infl(2nP ) + (Infl(2nP ′) + Infl(−2nP ′)).
Using the inductive hypothesis, we can turn the right-hand side into
(2n+1(Infl(P )− γ(P )) + 2 · 4nγ(P )) + 2 γ(2nP ′).
Finally, because γ is proportional to variance, we can substitute in γ(2nP ′) = γ(2nP ) = 4nγ(P )
to get
2n+1(Infl(P )− γ(P )) + 4n+1γ(P ),
which is what we want.
Now we consider the case where n is negative. Then, because −n is positive, we have
Infl(2−nP ) = 2−n(Infl(P )− γ(P )) + 4−nγ(P ) for all P . Substituting 2nP for P and noting that
γ(2nP ) = 4nγ(P ), we get
Infl(P ) = 2−nInfl(2nP )− 2nγ(P ) + γ(P ),
and a bit of algebraic manipulation gives us the desired result.
Lemma 6 says that γ(P ) scales quadratically with P , whereas Infl(P ) − γ(P ) is only linear in P .
Because of this discrepancy in scaling, if Infl(P ) differs from γ(P ), we can repeatedly halve P to
end up with a random variable whose influence is negative. But this contradicts the nonnegativity
axiom, so we must have Infl(P ) = γ(P ) for all P . This informal argument is formalized below.
Theorem 7. Let Infl be an influence measure that satisfies nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity,
and zero-covariance additivity. Then, Infl(P ) = γ(P ) for all P .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that Infl(P ) 6= γ(P ). If Infl(P ) > γ(P ), then
Infl(−P ) < γ(−P ), so we can assume without loss of generality that γ(P ) − Infl(P ) > 0.
Choose a small enough n such that 2n < γ(P )−Infl(P )γ(P ) . Then, by Lemma 6,
Infl(2nP ) = 2n(Infl(P )− γ(P )) + 4nγ(P ) = 2nγ(P )
(
2n − γ(P )− Infl(P )
γ(P )
)
< 0,
which contradicts the nonnegativity axiom.
Finally, we can unpack the definition of γ(P ) to arrive at the final result of this section, which states
that the influence measure must be proportional to variance. Our definition of influence simply
chooses the constant of proportionality that gives unit influence to the whole model.
Theorem 8. If Infl satisfies nonnegativity, nonconstant positivity, and zero-covariance additivity,
then Infl(P ) ∝ Var(P ).
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